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It is great to be here, both because it is always nice to come to
NYU, and also because it is nice to see so many friends, old and
new, among the people who are visiting NYU. Today, we are talk-
ing about preemption. This issue deals not just with the question of
torts and pharmaceuticals: It deals with some of the deepest ques-
tions we have before us in terms of regulation and incentives in a
time of crisis.
It seems to me, speaking as an academic and not as a judge,
that there has been a tendency for courts to view the topic of pre-
emption very narrowly and to lose many of the nuances that are
really involved. Judges view preemption questions in terms of the
case coming before them, and they give binary, yes or no, answers.
But most of the issues are more complicated. I am going to try to
sort out some of these issues, which are often conflated in the cases.
The first question that has to be asked is: Does national central-
ized decision-making, as between safety and accidents-and as to
who bears the cost of safety or the cost of accidents-work better
than local, diverse, and diffuse decision-making? Does one want lo-
calities deciding these questions in a variety of different ways, both
in terms of who bears the cost and what the cost-benefit is, or is the
decision best made nationally and uniformly? This question has
several different aspects to it. For example, what are the added
costs of having a variety of different cost-benefit decisions made?
What are the costs that come from having one place do one thing
and another place do another?
The second question is: What are the benefits of allowing dif-
ferent local decisions? We all know, and repeat, the Brandeisian
t This is a modified transcript of remarks given by Hon. Guido Calabresi at
the 2009 Symposium of the New York University Annual Survey of American Law
(February 27, 2009). The Symposium was entitled Tort Law in the Shadow of Agency
Preemption. Judge Calabresi provided the keynote address. The recording of the
speech is on file with the New York University Annual Survey of American Law.
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Calabresi was
nominated to a seat on the bench in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit by President Clinton and received his commission in 1994. He has
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an L.L.B. from Yale Law School.
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notion that allowing different decisions fosters experimentation.1
But we must also understand that in our system, local decision-mak-
ing is very important so that we can have different values intro-
duced into the system. We are profoundly red and blue. Abraham
Lincoln was wrong when he said the nation could not live half-slave
and half-free.2 We did for a very long time live half-slave and half-
free until Dred Scott said the country had to live all-slave. 3 Then the
Abolitionists, who were right but repulsive as far as most
Northerners were concerned, became acceptable: If it was going to
be all one way, then it was going to be our way.
How often in America do we have, and want to have, different
values, different notions of what life is worth, of what things are
worth? In this sense it is interesting and perhaps not surprising that
we have not had a national tort law in the United States. I believe
that the United States is much more divided in terms of values than
is Europe-I am talking about the core, old Europe, because those
countries share similar values. And that may be why Europe can
stand not having a strong central government. Consider the death
penalty. Countries that have the death penalty may not join the
European Union. In the United States, opinions are widely diver-
gent on that topic. And so it is with other things. Europe had bet-
ter watch out when it decides to expand beyond the core that has
certain values, because it will then need a strong central govern-
ment. We survived, with different values, only because we had a
very strong central government at the time of the Civil War. So that
is what the second question asks: What are the benefits of introduc-
ing different values into a decision-making system?
The third question is: What does the difference between local-
ized and centralized decision-making tell us about who bears the
burden of these decisions? In torts cases, the choice is not only as
to how many accident costs we want, how many safety costs we want,
and which ones. That is certainly an important issue. But there is
also the question of who bears the costs. If we do not allow new
drugs, some people are going to suffer. If we do allow new drugs,
other people will suffer. Will the person who uses a drug that has
come in more recently, more quickly, bear the cost, or will it be the
person who doesn't get the drug because there has been a greater
1. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
2. Abraham Lincoln, House Divided Speech (June 16, 1858).
3. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1856).
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delay? They are different people, and that is separate from the
question of which alternative is more efficient.
The fact that underneath all of these choices there are distribu-
tional issues was brought home to me dramatically many years ago
when I went to the hospital to see my friend Alex Bickel, who
seemed very well except that he had just been diagnosed with termi-
nal brain cancer. I knew that his illness was a result of his smoking.
I was, and am, against prohibition because it generally is inefficient,
and prohibiting smoking would have all sorts of terrible conse-
quences. But I also knew that if smoking had been prohibited, Al-
exander Bickel would have lived because he would not have broken
the law. So maybe the option of prohibition is not efficient, but the
distributional consequences of one rule as against another were
brought home to me. Therefore, in this question of where we de-
cide, centrally or locally, there is not just the efficiency question.
Because wherever there is a cost-benefit there are some people who
bear the costs and some people who receive the benefits, and we
must ask ourselves: Who will those people be?
All of this is completely separate from the question of whether
the cost-benefit and distributional decisions are best made through
regulations or through incentives. The cases, because of the way
they come up, make it appear as if central decision-making means
regulation, and local decision-making means incentives. Yet, that is
not necessarily so. One could perfectly well have a national tort
system with national standards, which would apply to drugs all over
the country. And one could have local regulation and then con-
sider whether such local regulations are preempted by federal rules
(either regulatory or torts-like). We simply assume in these cases
that because, by-and-large, local rules consist of tort incentives and,
by-and-large, the national system is a system of administrative regu-
latory decision-making, that the tradeoff between torts and adminis-
trative regulation is what is involved in the question of preemption.
But that tradeoff is a very different question from whether to have
local decision-making as opposed to national decision-making. It is
a question of what kind of system we want, regardless of the level of
government at which it is implemented.
In addition to acting as if centralized decision-making is regula-
tory and localized decision-making is not, we often look at the two
systems in an idealized or demonized way. Justice Scalia, for in-
stance, talks about the tort system in the most disparaging terms.4
4. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) ("A jury, on the
other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned
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He may be right, but the existing tort system is not the only possible
system of incentives (as against regulation) that we could have.
That is, one could have, either at the national or at the local level, a
totally different system of incentives, like the old New Zealand sys-
tem, which would avoid the perceived flaws in current tort law.
Conversely, Justice Breyer, known to some of his friends as "the
Commissioner," sometimes describes agencies as if they were near-
perfect.5 Of course they are not. Others describe regulation as be-
ing inevitably corrupt, overtaken by, and in the hands of, the regu-
latees. 6 This too is an overstatement.
If we are serious, we should ask not just the questions of
whether decisions should be made at the national or local level,
and not just whether we should use regulation rather than incen-
tives. Rather, we should also ask: Absent a perfect system, which
system would work reasonably well? And, in doing so, we should
consider variations from the existing regulation or tort models. Yet
we talk about preemption in particular cases as if none of these
alternatives are possible.
Now, of course, courts deal with specific cases that come before
them. And, if the courts were only treating these issues in a tradi-
tional legal sense of saying, "this is what Congress said or this is
what Congress intended," then speaking as if the universe of op-
tions were closed would be understandable. But, when courts ad-
dress the broadest policy questions and decide one way or
another-because, for instance, they like or do not like existing tort
law-the issues become more complicated. Thus, one often finds
people saying, "torts means no experts; regulation means experts."
That is not necessarily so. It is possible to have a regulatory system
comprised of rotating lay people, which would avoid the danger of
having the decision-makers be co-opted by the regulatees, but
which would also not have experts. Conversely, a system of incen-
tives could be established through expert bodies. All of this gets
with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in
court.").
5. See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(holding that courts should defer to the agency's preemption determination be-
cause of "special understanding of the likely impact of both state and federal re-
quirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to which) state
requirements may interfere with federal objectives").
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent
with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 491, 492 (2008) (arguing that it is not
possible to "shield administrative agencies in highly sensitive areas from various
forms of factional and political influence that have little or nothing to do with
technical expertise").
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lost in the simplicity of the legal case before courts that know little
about regulation and virtually nothing about torts.
The current discussion also fails to ask some subsidiary ques-
tions that arise in the light of these first questions that I have put to
you. Who, where, and by whom are minimum standards of behavior
best set, as against total standards of behavior? What institutions
are best suited to decide the minimum levels we want individuals
(and corporations) to live up to? And is this "minimum" decision
best made locally or nationally? These may be very different ques-
tions from the "who, where, and what level" questions for setting
standards above that minimum. The classic tort position was very
simple on this issue: Administrative regulation and legislation are
very good at setting minimum standards, but minimum standards-
for example, laws whose violation establishes negligence per se-
are never safe havens. That was a rather simplistic notion, and I am
not sure that it is a notion that can survive today. But the question
of whether minimum standards are best set locally or nationally,
and whether they are best set by experts or by lay people, is rarely
talked about in the cases involving preemption.
There are consequences to this failure. If the government at
its highest levels sets total standards, it determines who is worth liv-
ing and who is worth dying because it determines what is worth
doing to save lives and what is not. Symbolically, that is a dangerous
position in which to put the State. I am reminded of Justice Potter
Stewart's question during the oral argument of the famous Pentagon
Papers case. 7 There he asked [to paraphrase],
Professor Bickel .... Let us assume that when the members of
the Court go back and open up this sealed record we find
something there that absolutely convinces us that its disclosure
would result in the sentencing to death of a hundred young
men whose only offense had been that they were nineteen
years old and had low draft numbers. What should we do?"
Professor Bickel started to answer as an academic, and then he
remembered that he was a lawyer before the Court and so effec-
tively said, "Justice Stewart, that isn't this case. Don't deal with it."9
And of course Justice Stewart did not. Justice Black, who died
shortly after writing an opinion in this case, told his clerks, who told
to me: "Stewart asked the right question, but the answer was
wrong." The problem is not that a hundred lives would be lost. In
7. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
8. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-46, NY Times Co., 403 U.S. 713
(No. 1873).
9. See id.
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the parlance of the time, we waste a hundred lives all the time for
things far less important than freedom of speech. The terrible as-
pect is that the Supreme Court of the United States would be saying
that a hundred lives are not worth saving. That is why we try to save
people crazy enough to row across the Atlantic, or spend millions to
save hostages who are taken. Even when lives in some sense are not
"worth it," symbolically they are much too important to ignore.
Justice Black's answer to this problem was rather dire [to para-
phrase]: We should have an absolute rule against all prior restraints
so that if people die as a result of publication, they do so before any
court can be involved. That is, ensure that the hostages die before
anybody can go rescue them.
Justice Black's approach was draconian. But, whether he was
right or wrong, there is a danger in having the State make very clear
what lives are worth saving and what lives are not. One advantage-
and I am not saying that it wins out-of having the State, whether
national or local, set minimum standards is that the State is then in
the position of saying: People must do at least this much, but more
should be done. The State thereby avoids being in the position of
saying it is okay to kill someone.
Of course, the other side is that if we use an incentive system
we come mighty close to pricing lives. We find ways to avoid having
the State say that Dick Epstein is worth more than Peter Schuck.
But we do it by creating a system that tells us that Epstein and
Schuck are both worth exactly $87,327 (which sounds like rather
much to me).
The other question that gets lost in this is whether these deci-
sions are best made ex post or ex ante. Regulation tends to tell us
what is acceptable ahead of time on the basis of what is known at
that time. We all know that supposedly in torts, under the old
Learned Hand test, liability for negligence is based on what a rea-
sonable person should have known at the time the accident-causing
event took place. But there is also strict liability, and, very often,
torts decides on the basis of what we have learned because of the
accident or after it and so creates incentives for people to think
about what we do not yet know. Now again, is that good? Is it bad?
Is it best done nationally? Is it best done locally? Is the decision
best made by experts or not by experts if it is ex post or not? Is an
ex post vantage point best for minimum standards or maximum
standards? All these are the questions that are inherent in the
problem of preemption.
Finally, there is the question of what kind of decision-makers
we want to have make all these decisions. And this raises not only
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the questions of: (a) what kind of decision-makers we want; if we
want local or national, minimum or maximum, incentive or regula-
tory decisions; (b) when do we think lay people are good at making
the decisions; and (c) when do we think experts are good at it. If
the problem is as complex as I believe it to be, it also raises the
question of who is best suited to make the decision of what we do?
If Congress speaks, we all know that we comply. But Congress
rarely says anything, or if it says anything, it often does not know
what it is saying. And that is so in both directions. Did Congress say
something in Medtronic?0 Did it say something in Wyeth?' I do not
believe that Congress said anything in Wyeth, though some people
have suggested that it did. But in Medtronic, yes, Congress did say
something; but did Congress mean it? And if Congress now turns
around and says it meant the opposite in Medtronic, does that really
mean anything at all? In the temple of truth, should we not at least
ask: How can we make sure that the decision, as to who makes these
decisions, is better made? If Congress is not good at it, believe me,
the courts are lousy. State courts, elected as they are in most places,
federal courts, selected as we are-God help us!
A federal court like the Supreme Court-which understanda-
bly spends most of its time talking about civil rights, national secur-
ity, and how many people should be hanged-does not know a
darned thing about this issue. As far as I am concerned, there is
only one Justice of the Supreme Court who really understands torts
and that is Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The other Justice who comes
close is Clarence Thomas. But who else can make these decisions if
not courts?12 A royal commission of the United States? I do not
know, but I think we ought to think about all this because otherwise
these decisions will be made in the most simplistic way, and, inevita-
bly, the nature of the decisions will shape the commentary in these
discussions.
Now, some will say, as good Burkean conservatives, that if there
is no way of making a decision well, we should stick with traditions
and old presumptions. And for a long time we did just that. The
old presumptions held that one does not assume preemption; that
courts should not presume that federal standards do more than es-
10. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
11. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
12. Some, usually administrative law professors, suggest administrative agen-
cies should decide who decides. But when they do so, they almost always speak of
idealized agencies and not the real life, flawed ones.
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tablish the minimum. 13 That seems not to be working. But for a
long time, the reason we stuck with presumptions like these was not
because they were particularly good, but because we felt very un-
comfortable with making any decisions in any other way.
The underlying questions remain: how to decide between reg-
ulation and incentives, how to decide between regulation and in-
centives locally and nationally, how to decide between regulation
and incentives when we are unwilling to bear the distributional
costs of incentives or of regulations. If we do not think seriously
about these questions then the whole nature of the society in which
we have all grown up, that we have taken for granted-a system,
that is, that makes predominant use of incentives that are well-con-
trolled, fine-tuned, often bad, and with dramatic distributional con-
sequences-will cease to be in ways that might surprise us. That
will be true not just in torts, but in the economy as a whole.
Thank you.
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I thought that I would begin by putting my priors on the table.
On that front, I am actually surprised but pleased to find out that I
might be agreeing more with Rick [Hills] than I was expecting to
on this panel. On the institutional design question I share some
concerns with Susan [Frederick] and Dan [Schweitzer]. However,
in the preemption context my inclination is that federal agencies
can, and have the capacity to, do a better balancing of the federal-
ism and national interests than either Congress or the courts. And
I also think that there are instances in which agencies can legiti-
mately preempt on obstacle grounds, although I find the recent
expansion in obstacle preemption very concerning.
The point I want to start with, however, relates back to Con-
gress. I think it is hard to challenge the legitimacy gains of greater
congressional involvement in this area. In particular, Congress
needs to be involved in order to address the social insurance aspect
of preemption cases. This is because agencies do not have the abil-
ity to say, without congressional approval, that even if we make the
right systemic regulatory decision, somebody is going to get hurt
and maybe compensation should be available. A decision to pro-
vide compensation has to be made at the congressional level. I
agree, though, with Rick [Hills] that Congress has shown too much
predilection for addressing preemption without the kind of clarity
and specificity that is needed. In addition, if we are talking about
issues that are going to end up having an administrative edge, the
reality is that Congress generally delegates very broadly to agencies.
I find it difficult to imagine Congress as willing or able to change
that practice and delegate more clearly when it comes to adminis-
trative preemption. The typical reasons given for why Congress del-
egates broadly-the political difficulties of reaching agreement on
regulatory specifics; the lack of time and expertise needed to ad-
t This is a modified transcript of remarks given by Prof. Gillian Metzger at
the 2009 Symposium of the New York University Annual Survey of American Law
(February 28, 2009). The Symposium was entitled Tort Law in the Shadow of Agency
Preemption. Professor Metzger spoke on the panel entitled "Issues of Federalism."
A recording of all speeches is on file with the New York University Annual Survey of
American Law.
* Professor Metzger is a professor at Columbia Law School. She received a
J.D. from Columbia, a B. Phil. from Oxford, and a B.A. from Yale.
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dress specific issues; the need to have regulatory schemes that are
flexible and can respond to new challenges as they emerge-all ap-
ply in the context of administrative preemption.
What I am even more convinced of is that a greater role for
agencies in the preemption context is simply inevitable. The rea-
sons are not only the economic and national political reasons that
Rick [Hills] mentioned, but additionally, I do not think that courts
are going to enforce rules requiring Congress to play a central role.
It is just too much at odds with the norms of the national adminis-
trative state that we have developed over the last century-and are
only developing further-to think that is going to happen. So I
truly believe that we need to face the fact that agencies will inevita-
bly play a bigger role here. I happen to think that that is not a bad
outcome. Although agencies have many of the pathologies that
have been identified already today, they also have some important
strengths in terms of their ability to apply area-specific expertise
and weigh state and national interests in particular regulatory con-
texts. I believe that too often the national-state debate is presented
as being necessarily the kind of stark conflict that it was under the
Bush Administration, without much sympathy to state interests at
the national level. I am not so sure that national and state regula-
tory interests are always as opposed to one another as is sometimes
conveyed. Another point to note about agencies, which is impor-
tant for what I want to get to, is that agencies are more amenable to
being checked by a variety of different actors than either Congress
or the courts. That matters because I think the issue on which we
should be focusing-the real institutional design question-is: Ac-
cepting that agencies are inevitably going to be playing a role here,
how do we structure their involvement to make sure that they make
the best decisions about preemption? In particular for federalism
interests, how do we structure their involvement to ensure that state
and local interests are adequately heard, responded to, and taken
seriously? That was what Rick [Hills] was getting at in terms of the
Vice President,' and I have somewhat similar suggestions to make.
First, let me talk about a couple of other approaches. As Rick
[Hills] mentioned, one of the things I, [Catherine Sharkey], and a
number of others have advocated for is the traditional administra-
tive law response of enhanced judicial review. And I do think that
subjecting preemption determinations to a more searching scrutiny
could have some traction. If you look at some of the preemption
1. See Roderick M. Hills, Remarks at the New York University Annual Survey of
American Law Symposium: Tort Law in the Shadow of Agency Preemption (Feb. 27,
209) (transcript available at New York University Annual Survey of American Law).
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regulations that came out under the Bush Administration, there are
some fairly obvious APA [Administrative Procedure Act] 2 issues that
can be raised. For example, there are issues involving inadequate
notice. Such APA procedural reversal might only serve to slow
down adoption of the agency's preemptive position. But with an
agency that is even nominally responsive, the possibility exists that
such reversals might have some substantive effect down the road.
You can again put this down to my priors; I tend to believe that
agencies are not so committed to a pre-chosen path that they are
not interested in hearing other voices or open to responding to
states' concerns. Agencies are under-resourced to be sure, and can
have programmatic tunnel vision. Sometimes agencies can be
overly politicized. But I believe it is a mistake to assume that agen-
cies will be unresponsive. The critical issue is designing agencies
and their relationships with their political and judicial overseers so
as to encourage agencies to take other interests and perspectives
seriously. As a result, I see some potential for the option of en-
hanced judicial scrutiny to improve preemption determinations.
Another option at the national level is enhanced congressional
oversight. [Catherine Sharkey] has spoken a little bit about that in
terms of Executive Order 131323 and we heard some discussion to-
day about FDA [Food and Drug Administration] oversight. There
are some obvious avenues on this front that matter. The angle I
would emphasize more, however-and Rick [Hills] made this point
too4-involves intra-agency checks. I could not agree more with
Rick [Hills] about trying to learn lessons from the example of coop-
erative federalism. If we accept the inevitability of federal agencies
being involved in this area, a key question is how to structure the
federal regulatory process to fully bring in state and local interests.
Another mechanism might be to try to require the establish-
ment of advisory committees within each agency, embodying state
and local interests, as a means to create ongoing contact between
the different levels of regulators. Issues will of course exist about
whom to put on such advisory committees to represent state and
local interests. But what is needed is a formal intra-agency institu-
tional structure to represent state and local interests [a] that has an
existence beyond a particular issue, [b] that is not dependent on
the agency triggering a request for comments in a particular case,
and [c] that, over time and through ongoing interactions, can build
confidence, relationships, and receptivity among federal, state, and
2. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-6 (2006).
3. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999).
4. See Hills, supra note 1.
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local regulators. While I think the Vice President can also serve a
role in terms of appeals from agencies, we really should consider
building into the agencies greater sensitivity to state and local inter-
ests. This should include even those agencies that do not take a
cooperative form, that implement more dual regulatory regimes, or
that represent centralized federal regulatory power without a state
analog. Some kind of advisory committee structure is one option
for building such a formal institutional representation of federalism
concerns.
There is also the option of trying to do more with the executive
order and OMB [Office of Management and Budget]. That only
works, of course, if you have an OMB that is sympathetic. But as
Susan [Frederick] was saying, some potential exists here for a more
centralized emphasis on taking state and local interests seriously.
When that has happened-when agencies start taking the 13132
process of federalism generally more seriously-agency institu-
tional culture can be significantly affected.
The last point I want to make gets outside of the executive
branch and focuses instead on what states and local governments
can do, and do collectively, independently of federal agencies. One
of the things I find very interesting, when you look at preemption
clauses, is the extent to which they reserve what I would call "com-
plementary state measures." The language is often along the lines
of, "state regulations that are identical and not in addition to fed-
eral regulation are preserved." This may create an opening for
states to do more policing of the federal administrative process
than has so far occurred. And it certainly is an opening I would like
to see state and local governments explore. For example, regulated
entities that are filing reports with the FDA of certain complications
could also be required to file with states and, perhaps, local bodies.
These governments would then be in a better position to police
whether or not the FDA is adequately responsive to such filings and
to petition the FDA or use their contacts at the federal government
to increase national regulatory responsiveness. This approach is ob-
viously much easier when there is a cooperative regulatory scheme.
But one of the things that states may need to do is develop analo-
gous regulatory competency in areas where they may have ceded
too much to the federal regime, so they can play such a policing
role. Developing such competency might also lead to more regula-
tory experimentation. For example, state-level agencies may be
able to develop mechanisms that enhance regulators' access to in-
formation, so that tort suits need not be so important as informa-
tion-gathering tools.
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I am actually quite open to arguments that none of these ideas
will work. The one point that I am certain of is that the issue that
needs to be addressed is how agencies confront the federalism is-
sue. I am skeptical that trying to bump up preemption determina-
tions to Congress is going to work in the long run. And, as was said
at the earlier panel, I am concerned that we are not going to end
up with a very sensible regulatory regime if we try and leave pre-
emption determinations in the first instance to the courts.
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